Ed's Memorial Notes: Jefferson Manual

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Jefferson's Manual

Jefferson's Manual is a sort of interpretive guide to parliamentary procedure, and is included (along with the Constitution) in the bound volumes of the Rules of the House of Representatives. It is ratified by each congress (including the current one), and has been updated continuously through the history of our democracy.

Within the Manual itself, the section covering impeachment is designated Section LIII. Section 603 refers to the section of the entire volume (including the Constitution and Rules) in which you'll find the listing of acceptable vehicles for bringing impeachment motions to the floor.

The second vehicle being of most interest to our method. It reads:"In the House of Representatives there are various methods of setting an impeachment in motion: by charges made on the floor on the responsibility of a Member or Delegate (II, 1303; III, 2342, 2400, 2469; VI, 525, 526, 528, 535, 536); by charges preferred by a memorial, which is usually referred to a committee for examination (III, 2364, 2491, 2494, 2496, 2499, 2515; VI, 552);

or by a resolution dropped in the hopper by a Member and referred to a committee (April 15, 1970, p. 11941-2);

by a message from the President (III, 2294, 2319; VI, 498); by charges transmitted from the legislature of a State (III, 2469) or Territory (III, 2487)

or from a grand jury (III, 2488); or from facts developed and reported by an investigating committee of the House (III, 2399, 2444).

"While some of these words are no longer used in our everyday speech, here are the important bolded words above to understand:

Memorial: "a written statement of facts accompanying a petition presented to somebody in authority"Petitions, memorials, and private bills

[110th Congress House Rules Manual -- House Document No. 108-241][From the U.S. Government Printing Office Online Database]

Petitions, memorials, and other papers addressed to the House may be presented by the Speaker as well as by a Member (IV, 3312). Petitions from the country at large are presented by the Speaker in the manner prescribed by the rule (III, 2030; IV, 3318; VII, 1025).

A Member may present a petition from the people of a State other than his own (IV, 3315, 3316

The House itself may refer one portion of a petition to one committee and another portion to another committee (IV, 3359, 3360), but ordinarily the reference of a petition does not come before the House itself. A committee may receive a petition only through the House (IV, 4557).

Source: U.S. Government Printing Office

Preferred: "to make a charge against somebody by submitting details of the alleged offense to a court, magistrate, or judge for examination, or prosecute such a charge"

from the Encarta® World English Dictionary

Source: U.S. Government Printing Office

IMPORTANT BELOW!

Precedents:Hinds - III, 2364, 2491, 2494, 2496, 2499, 2515Cannon's - VI, 552THE JEFFERSON MANUAL http://www.constitution.org/tj/tj-mpp.htmEC.

LIII.IMPEACHMENT.

THE House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. Constitution United States, I. 3.

The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments.

When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation.

When the President of the United States is tried, the chief justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.

Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States.

But the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment, according to law.

Constitution, I. 3.The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors. Constitution, II. 4.The trial of crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury.

Constitution, III. 2.These are the provisions of the Constitution of the United States on the subject of impeachments.

The following is a sketch of some of the principles and practices of England on the same subject.

Jurisdiction. The Lords cannot impeach any to themselves, nor join in the accusation, because they are the judges. Seld. Judic. in Parl. 12, 63. (A work of doubtful authority.) 4 Hats. 153, 186. Nor can they proceed against a Commoner but on complaint of the Commons. Ib. 84. The Lords may not, by the law, try a Commoner for a capital offence, on the information of the king, or a private person; because the accused is entitled to a trial by his peers generally; but on accusation by the House of Commons, they may proceed against the delinquent of whatsoever degree, and whatsoever be the nature of the offence; for there they do not assume to themselves trial at common law.

The Commons are then instead of a jury, and the judgment is given on their demand, which is instead of a verdict. So the Lords do only judge, but not try the delinquent. Ib. 6, 7. But Wooddeson denies that a Commoner can now be charged capitally before the Lords, even by the Commons; and cites Fitzharris's case, 1681, impeached of high treason, where the Lords remitted the prosecution to the inferior court. 8 Grey's Deb. 325 ... 7. 2 Wooddeson 601, 576. 3 Seld. 1610, 1619, 1641. 4 Blacks. 257. 3 Seld. 1604, 1618, 9, 1656. 4 Hats. 200. et passim contra.

Accusation. The Commons, as the grand inquest of the nation, become suitors for penal justice. 2 Wood. 597, 6 Grey 356. The general course is, to pass a resolution containing a criminal charge against the supposed delinquent, and then to direct some member to impeach him by oral accusation at the bar of the House of Lords, in the name of the Commons. The person signifies that the articles will be exhibited, and desires that the delinquent may be sequestered from his seat, or be committed, or that the peers will take order for his appearance.

Sachev. Trial. 325. 2 Wood. 602, 605. Lords' Journ. 3 June, 1701. 1 Wms. 616. 6 Grey 324.Process. If the party do not appear, proclamations are to be issued, giving him a day to appear. On their return they are strictly examined. If any error be found in them, a new proclamation issues, giving a short day.

If he appear not, his goods may be arrested, and they may proceed. Seld. Jud. 98, 99.Articles. The accusation (articles) of the Commons is substituted in place of an indictment. Thus, by the usage of Parliament, in impeachment for writing or speaking, the particular words need not be specified. Sach. Tr. 325. 2 Wood. 602, 605. Lords' Journ. 3 June, 1701. 1 Wms. 616.

Appearance. If he appears, and the case be capital, he answers in custody; though not if the accusation be general. He is not to be committed but on special accusations. If it be for a misdemeanor only, he answers a Lord in his place, a Commoner at the bar, and not in custody, unless, on the answer, the Lords find cause to commit him, till he finds sureties to attend, and lest he should fly. Seld. Jud. 98, 99. 4 Hats. 176, 185. A copy of the articles is given him, and a day fixed for his answer. T. Ray. 1 Rushw. 268. Fost. 232. 1 Clar. Hist. of the Reb. 379.

On a misdemeanor, his apperance may be in person, or he may answer in writing, or by attorney. Seld. Jud. 100. The general rule on an accusation for a misdemeanor is, that in such a state of liberty or restraint as the party is when the Commons complain of him, in such he is to answer. Ib. 101.

If previously committed by the Commons, he answers as a prisoner. But this may be called in some sort judicium parium suorum. Ib.

In misdemeanors, the party has a right to counsel by the common law; but not in capital cases. Seld. Jud. 102 ... 5.Answer. The answer need not observe great strictness of form. He may plead guilty as to part, and defend as to the residue; or, saving all exceptions, deny the whole, or give a particular answer to each article separately. 1 Rush. 274. 2 Rush. 1374. 12 Parl. Hist. 442. 3 Lord's Journ. 13 Nov. 1643. 2 Wood. 607. But he cannot plead a pardon in bar to the impeachment. 2 Wood. 615. 2 St. Tr. 735.Replication, Rejoinder, &c.

There may be a replication, rejoinder, &c. Seld. Jud. 114. 8 Grey's Deb. 233. Sachev. Tr. 15. Journ. H. of Commons, 6 March, 1640 ... 1.Witnesses. The practice is to swear the witnesses in open House, and then examine them there: or a committee may be named, who shall examine them in committee, either on interrogatories agreed on in the House, or such as the committee in their discretion shall demand. Seld. Jud. 120, 123.Jury. In the case of Alice Pierce, 1 P. 2. a jury was impanelled for her trial before a committee. Seld. Jud. 123.

But this was on a complaint, not on impeachment by the Commons. Seld. Jud. 163. It must also have been for a misdemeanor only, as the Lords spiritual sat in the case, which they do on misdemeanors, but not in capital cases. Ib. 148. The judgment was a forfeiture of all her lands and goods. Ib. 188. This, Selden says, is the only jury he finds recorded in Parliament for misdemeanors: but he makes no doubt, if the delinquent doth put himself on the trial of his country, a jury ought to be impanelled, and he adds, that it is not so on impeachment by the Commons; for they are in loco proprio, and there no jury ought to be impanelled. Ib. 124.

The Ld. Berkeley, 6 E. 3. was arraigned for the murder of E. 2. on an information on the part of the king, and not on impeachment of the Commons; for then they had been patria sua.He waived his peerage, and was tried by a jury of Gloucestershire and Warwickshire. Ib. 125. But 4 Hats. 73, says he was a Commoner, and that there was no waiver of privilege.

In 1 H. 7. the Commons protest that they are not to be considered as parties to any judgment given, or hereafter to be given in Parliament. Ib. 133. They have been generally, and more justly, considered, as is before stated, as the grand jury.

For the conceit of Selden is certainly not accurate, that they are the patria sua of the accused, and that the Lords do only judge, but not try. It is undeniable that they do try. For they examine witnesses as to the facts, and acquit or condemn, according to their own belief of them. And Lord Hale says, "the peers are judges of law as well as of fact." 2 Hale P. C. 275. Consequently of fact as well as of law.Presence of Commons.

The Commons are to be present at the examination of witnesses. Seld. Jud. 124. Indeed they are to attend throughout, either as a committee of the whole House, or otherwise, at discretion, appoint managers to conduct the proofs. Rush. Tr. of Straff. 37. Com. Journ. 4 Feb. 1709 ... 10. 2 Wood. 614. And judgment is not to be given till they demand it. Seld. Jud. 124. But they are not to be present on impeachment when the Lords consider of the answer or proofs, and determine of their judgment. Their presence however is necessary at the answer and judgment in cases capital, ib. 158, 159, as well as not capital. 162.

The Lords debate the judgment among themselves. Then the vote is first taken on the question of guilty or not guilty: and if they convict, the question, or particular sentence, is out of that which seemeth to be most generally agreed on. Sold. Jud. 167. 2 Wood. 612.

Judgment. Judgments in Parliament for death have been strictly guided per legem terræ, which they cannot alter: and not at all according to their discretion. They can neither omit any part of the legal judgment, nor add to it. Their sentence must be secundum, non ultra legem. Seld. Jud. 168, 171. This trial, though it varies in external ceremony, yet differs not in essentials from criminal prosecutions before inferior courts.

The same rules of evidence, the same legal notions of crimes and punishments prevail. For impeachments are not framed to alter the law, but to carry it into more effectual execution against two powerful delinquents. The judgment therefore is to be such as is warranted by legal principles or precedents. 6 Sta. Tr. 14. 2 Wood. 611. The Chancellor gives judgments in misdemeanors; the Lord High Steward formerly in cases of life and death. Seld. Jud. 180. But now the Steward is deemed not necessary. Fost. 144. 2 Wood. 613.

In misdemeanors, the greatest corporal punishment hath been imprisonment. Seld. Jud. 184. The king's assent is necessary in capital judgments, (but 2 Wood. 614, contra) but not in misdemeanors. Seld. Jud. 136.Continuance. An impeachment is not discontinued by the dissolution of Parliament; but may be resumed by the new Parliament. T. Ray. 383. 4 Com. Journ. 23 Dec. 1790. Lords' Journ. May 16, 1791. 2 Wood. 618.

THE END.I WISH!

Michael Moore’s Presentationhttp://www.michaelmoore.com/mustread/index.php?id=622Impeachment Clauses (University of Chicago Presentation)http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a1_2_5s1.html

RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION

Background and Development

The right of petition took its rise from the modest provision made for it in chapter 61 of Magna Carta (1215). 207

To this meagre beginning are traceable, in some measure, Parliament itself and its procedures in the enactment of legislation, the equity jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, and proceedings against the Crown by ''petition of right.'' Thus, while the King summoned Parliament for the purpose of supply, the latter--but especially the House of Commons--petitioned the King for a redress of grievances as its price for meeting the financial needs of the Monarch, and as it increased in importance it came to claim the right to dictate the form of the King's reply, until, in 1414, Commons declared itself to be ''as well assenters as petitioners.

'' Two hundred and fifty years later, in 1669, Commons further resolved that every commoner in England possessed ''the inherent right to prepare and present petitions'' to it ''in case of grievance,'' and of Commons ''to receive the same'' and to judge whether they were ''fit'' to be received. Finally Chapter 5 of the Bill of Rights of 1689 asserted the right of the subjects to petition the King and ''all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning to be illegal.'' 208


Historically, therefore, the right of petition is the primary right, the right peaceably to assemble a subordinate and instrumental right, as if the First Amendment read: ''the right of the people peaceably to assemble'' in order to ''petition the government.'' 209 Today, however, the right of peaceable assembly is, in the language of the Court, ''cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental. . . . [It] is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions--principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause. . . . The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.

Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score.

The question . . . is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purposes; not as to the relation of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.'' 210 Furthermore, the right of petition has expanded.

It is no longer confined to demands for ''a redress of grievances,'' in any accurate meaning of these words, but comprehends demands for an exercise by the Government of its powers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners and of their views on politically contentious matters. 211

The right extends to the ''approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.'' 212

The right of petition recognized by the First Amendment first came into prominence in the early 1830's, when petitions against slavery in the District of Columbia began flowing into Congress in a constantly increasing stream, which reached its climax in the winter of 1835.

Finally on January 28, 1840, the House adopted as a standing rule: ''That no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever.''

Because of efforts of John Quincy Adams, this rule was repealed five years later. 213

For many years now the rules of the House of Representatives have provided that members having petitions to present may deliver them to the Clerk and the petitions, except such as in the judgment of the Speaker are of an obscene or insulting character, shall be entered on the Journal and the Clerk shall furnish a transcript of such record to the official reporters of debates for publication in the Record. 214

Even so, petitions for the repeal of the espionage and sedition laws and against military measures for recruiting resulted, in World War I, in imprisonment. 215 Processions for the presentation of petitions in the United States have not been particularly successful.

In 1894 General Coxey of Ohio organized armies of unemployed to march on Washington and present petitions, only to see their leaders arrested for unlawfully walking on the grass of the Capitol. The march of the veterans on Washington in 1932 demanding bonus legislation was defended as an exercise of the right of petition. The Administration, however, regarded it as a threat against the Constitution and called out the army to expel the bonus marchers and burn their camps. Marches and encampments have become more common since, but the results have been mixed.

The Cruikshank Case .--

The right of assembly was first before the Supreme Court in 1876 216 in the famous case of United States v. Cruikshank. 217 The Enforcement Act of 1870 218 forbade conspiring or going onto the highways or onto the premises of another to intimidate any other person from freely exercising and enjoying any right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States.

Defendants had been indicted under this Act on charges of having deprived certain citizens of their right to assemble together peaceably with other citizens ''for a peaceful and lawful purpose.'' While the Court held the indictment inadequate because it did not allege that the attempted assembly was for a purpose related to the Federal Government, its dicta broadly declared the outlines of the right of assembly.

''The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.'' 219

Absorption of the assembly and petition clauses into the liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means, or course, that the Cruikshank limitation is no longer applicable. 220

The Hague Case .--Illustrative of this expansion is Hague v. CIO, 221 in which the Court, though splintered with regard to reasoning and rationale, struck down an ordinance which vested an uncontrolled discretion in a city official to permit or deny any group the opportunity to conduct a public assembly in a public place.

Justice Roberts, in an opinion which Justice Black joined and with which Chief Justice Hughes concurred, found protection against state abridgment of the rights of assembly and petition in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

''The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.'' 222

Justices Stone and Reed invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the result, thereby claiming the rights of assembly and petition for aliens as well as citizens. ''I think respodents' right to maintain it does not depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly be made to turn on the existence or non-existence of a purpose to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act.

It is enough that petitioners have prevented respondents from holding meetings and disseminating information whether for the organization of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose.'' 223 This due process view of Justice Stone has carried the day over the privileges and immunities approach.

Later cases tend to merge the rights of assembly and petition into the speech and press clauses, and, indeed, all four rights may well be considered as elements of an inclusive right to freedom of expression. Certain conduct may call forth a denomination of petition 224 or assembly, 225 but there seems little question that no substantive issue turns upon whether one may be said to be engaged in speech or assembly or petition.

Footnotes

[Footnote 207] C. Stephenson & F. Marcham, Sources of English Constitutional History 125 (1937).
[Footnote 208] 12 Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences 98 (1934).
[Footnote 209] United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876), reflects this view.
[Footnote 210] De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 , 365 (1937). See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
[Footnote 211] See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
[Footnote 212] California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 -15 (1982); Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (boycott of States not ratifying ERA may not be subjected to antitrust suits for economic losses because of its political nature).
[Footnote 213] The account is told in many sources. E.g., S. Bemis, John Quincy Adams and the Union, chs. 17, 18 and pp. 446-47 (1956).
[Footnote 214] Rule 22, para. 1, Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 256, 101st Congress, 2d sess. 571 (1991).
[Footnote 215] 1918 Att'y Gen. Ann. Rep. 48.
[Footnote 216] See, however, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), in which the Court gave as one of its reasons for striking down a tax on persons leaving the State its infringement of the right of every citizen to come to the seat of government and to transact any business he might have with it.
[Footnote 217] 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
[Footnote 218] Act of May 31, 1870, ch.114, 16 Stat. 141 (1870).
[Footnote 219] United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S 542, 552-53 (1876).
[Footnote 220] De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
[Footnote 221] 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
[Footnote 222] Id. at 515. For another holding that the right to petition is not absolute, see McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (the fact that defamatory statements were made in the context of a petition to government does not provide absolute immunity from libel).
[Footnote 223] Id. at 525.
[Footnote 224] E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
[Footnote 225] E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).

Before the House Judiciary Committee can put together the Articles of Impeachment, someone must initiate the impeachment procedure. Most often, this occurs when members of the House pass a resolution. Another method outlined in the manual, however, is for individual citizens to submit a memorial for impeachment.

After learning this information, Minnesotan and Impeach for Peace member (Jodin Morey) found precedent in an 1826 memorial by Luke Edward Lawless which had been successful in initiating the impeachment of Federal Judge James H. Peck.

Impeach for Peace then used this as a template for their "Do-It-Yourself Impeachment." Now any citizen can download the DIY Impeachment Memorial and submit it, making it possible for Americans to do what our representatives have been unwilling to do.

The idea is for so many people to submit the Memorial that it cannot be ignored.DOWNLOAD THE DOCUMENT Download, fill in your relevant information in the blanks (name, State, notary is optional), and send in a letter today. We're sending this wave in to House Rep. Dennis Kucinich who has recently spoken in favor of impeachment. There's also extra credit for sending a DIY Impeachment to your own representative as well as representatives reccommended by Keith Ellison of the House Judiciary.

Rights of Assembly and Petition
RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Background and Development

The right of petition took its rise from the modest provision made for it in chapter 61 of Magna Carta (1215).1339 To this meager beginning are traceable, in some measure, Parliament itself and its procedures for the enactment of legislation, the equity jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor, and proceedings against the Crown by “petition of right.”

Thus, while the King summoned Parliament for the purpose of supply, the latter—but especially the House of Commons—petitioned the King for a redress of grievances as its price for meeting the financial needs of the Monarch, and as it increased in importance it came to claim the right to dictate the form of the King’s reply, until, in 1414, Commons declared itself to be “as well assenters as petitioners.” Two hundred and fifty years later, in 1669, Commons further resolved that every commoner in England possessed “the inherent right to prepare and present petitions” to it “in case of grievance,” and of Commons “to receive the same” and to judge whether they were “fit” to be received. Finally Chapter 5 of the Bill of Rights of 1689 asserted the right of the subjects to petition the King and “all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning to be illegal.”1340

Historically, therefore, the right of petition is the primary right, the right peaceably to assemble a subordinate and instrumental right, as if the First Amendment read: “the right of the people peaceably to assemble” in order to “petition the government.”1341

Today, however, the right of peaceable assembly is, in the language of the Court, “cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.... [It] is one that cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all civil and political institutions— principles which the Fourteenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due process clause.... The holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed.

Those who assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The question . . . is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held but as to its purposes; not as to the relation of the speakers, but whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects.”1342

Furthermore, the right of petition has expanded. It is no longer confined to demands for “a redress of grievances,” in any accurate meaning of these words, but comprehends demands for an exercise by the Government of its powers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners and of their views on politically contentious matters.1343

The right extends to the “approach of citizens or groups of them to administrative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Government. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one aspect of the right of petition.”1344

1339 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HIS-TORY 125 (1937).
1340 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98 (1934).
1341 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876), reflects this view.
1342 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 365 (1937). See also Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
1343 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
1344 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913-15 (1982); Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980) (boycott of States not ratifying ERA may not be subjected to antitrust suits for economic losses because of its political nature).

The right of petition recognized by the First Amendment first came into prominence in the early 1830’s, when petitions against slavery in the District of Columbia began flowing into Congress in a constantly increasing stream, which reached its climax in the winter of 1835.

Finally on January 28, 1840, the House adopted as a standing rule: “That no petition, memorial, resolution, or other paper praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or any State or Territories of the United States in which it now exists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way whatever.”

Because of efforts of John Quincy Adams, this rule was repealed five years later.1345 For many years now the rules of the House of Representatives have provided that members having petitions to present may deliver them to the Clerk and the petitions, except such as in the judgment of the Speaker are of an obscene or insulting character, shall be entered on the Journal and the Clerk shall furnish a transcript of such record to the official reporters of debates for publication in the Record.1346 Even so, petitions for the repeal of the espionage and sedition laws and against military measures for recruiting resulted, in World War I, in imprisonment.1347

Processions for the presentation of petitions in the United States have not been particularly successful. In 1894 General Coxey of Ohio organized armies of unemployed to march on Washington and present petitions, only to see their leaders arrested for unlawfully walking on the grass of the Capitol. The march of the veterans on Washington in 1932 demanding bonus legislation was defended as an exercise of the right of petition. The Administration, however, regarded it as a threat against the Constitution and called out the army to expel the bonus marchers and burn their camps. Marches and encampments have become more common since, but the results have been mixed.

1345 The account is told in many sources. E.g., S. BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY ADAMS AND THE UNION, chs. 17, 18 and pp. 446-47 (1956).
1346 Rule 22, ¶ 1, Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 256, 101st Congress, 2d sess. 571 (1991).
1347 1918 ATT'Y GEN. ANN. REP. 48.

The Cruikshank Case.—

The right of assembly was first before the Supreme Court in 18761348 in the famous case of United States v. Cruikshank1349 The Enforcement Act of 18701350 forbade conspiring or going onto the highways or onto the premises of another to intimidate any other person from freely exercising and enjoying any right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States. Defendants had been indicted under this Act on charges of having deprived certain citizens of their right to assemble together peaceably with other citizens “for a peaceful and lawful purpose.” While the Court held the indictment inadequate because it did not allege that the attempted assembly was for a purpose related to the Federal Government, its dicta broadly declared the outlines of the right of assembly.

“The right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National Government, is an attribute of national citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guaranteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for a redress of grievances.

If it had been alleged in these counts that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.”1351 Absorption of the assembly and petition clauses into the liberty protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means, or course, that the Cruikshank limitation is no longer applicable.1352

1348 See, however, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), in which the Court gave as one of its reasons for striking down a tax on persons leaving the State its infringement of the right of every citizen to come to the seat of government and to transact any business he might have with it.

1349 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
1350 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 141 (1870).
1351 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S 542, 552-53 (1876).
1352 De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).

The Hague Case.—Illustrative of this expansion is Hague v. CIO,1353 in which the Court, though splintered with regard to reasoning and rationale, struck down an ordinance which vested an uncontrolled discretion in a city official to permit or deny any group the opportunity to conduct a public assembly in a public place. Justice Roberts, in an opinion which Justice Black joined and with which Chief Justice Hughes concurred, found protection against state abridgment of the rights of assembly and petition in the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

“The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”1354 Justices Stone and Reed invoked the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for the result, thereby claiming the rights of assembly and petition for aliens as well as citizens. “I think respondents’ right to maintain it does not depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly be made to turn on the existence or non-existence of a purpose to disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act.

It is enough that petitioners have prevented respondents from holding meetings and disseminating information whether for the organization of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose.”1355 This due process view of Justice Stone has carried the day over the privileges and immunities approach.

Later cases tend to merge the rights of assembly and petition into the speech and press clauses, and, indeed, all four rights may well be considered as elements of an inclusive right to freedom of expression. Certain conduct may call forth a denomination of petition1356 or assembly,1357 but there seems little question that no substantive issue turns upon whether one may be said to be engaged in speech or assembly or petition.

1353 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
1354 307 U.S. at 515. For another holding that the right to petition is not absolute, see McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (the fact that defamatory statements were made in the context of a petition to government does not provide absolute immunity from libel).
1355 307 U.S. at 525.
1356 E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390 (2002).
1357 E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).

In a meeting Thursday, July 26th, 2007, members of ImpeachForPeace.org and After Downing Street met with Congressman Dennis Kucinich in his Washington DC office to present the Congressman with thousands of "Do It Yourself Impeachments" collected over the past few months.

DIY Impeachment Memorials are actually a little known and rarely used part of the Rules of the House of Representatives ("Jefferson's Manual"), which empowers individual citizens to initiate the impeachment against any federal official themselves.

These Memorials support the impeachment of Vice President Dick Cheney.

During our meeting, Congressman Kucinich agreed to place all signers of the DIY Impeachment Memorials specifically referencing Cheney into the Congressional record. Rep. Kucinich also agreed to enter into the record the names of signers of regular petitions to impeach Cheney.

Because there is a limit to the number of pages that a representative can submit to the Congressional Record each day, Rep. Kucinich stated he will continue to submit petitions every day until all the names are submitted. The most powerful statement for impeachment is the submission of a Memorial, however, so if you have not yet sent a Memorial for the impeachment of Vice President Cheney to ImpeachForPeace.org, please do so!

Go to http://impeachforpeace.org/ImpeachNow.html and download the Memorial. Then send it to the address listed on the cover letter.

"Jefferson's Manual" is an interpretive guide to parliamentary procedure, and is included (along with the Constitution) in the bound volumes of the Rules of the House of Representatives. It is ratified by each congress (including the current one), and has been updated continuously through the history of our democracy.

The section covering impeachment lists the acceptable vehicles for bringing impeachment motions to the floor of the House. Before the House Judiciary Committee can put together the Articles of Impeachment, someone must initiate the impeachment procedure. Most often, this occurs when members of the House pass a resolution. Another method outlined in the manual, however, is for individual citizens to submit a memorial for impeachment.

Since then, Kucinich held a press conference informing the public of this.
Enter your name into the Congressional Record
For more on the DIY Impeachment process, see this YouTube video
Alexandria Advocacy Alliance, On Behalf of the Citizens of The ...

The Alexandria Advocacy Alliance, On Behalf of the Citizens of The City of Alexandria, Virginia Petition to Impeachment of George W. Bush and Richard B. ...www.petitiononline.com/POIALXVA/petition.html - 10k - Cached - Similar pages - Note this
THE SCORE CARD:


19 CO-SPONSORS FOR H.RES. 333 RICHARD B. CHENEY

OH KUCINICH-10 CA - Woolsey-6, Lee-9, Farr-17, Waters-35, Filner-51
GA Johnson-4 IL Schakowsky-9
MD Wynn-4 MN Ellison-5
MO Clay-1 NJ Payne-10
NY Clarke-11 PA Brady-1
TN Cohen-9
TX Jackson-Lee-18
VA Moran-8
WA McDermott-7
WI Baldwin-2

28 CO-SPONSORS FOR H.RES. 589 ALBERTO R. GONZALES

WA Inslee-1 AZ Pastor-4, Grijalva-7
CA Tauscher-10, Becerra-31
CO Perlmutter-7
GA Johnson-4
IA Braley-1
KS Moore-3
KY Chandler-6
MA McGovern-3, Frank-4
MN McCollum-4, Ellison-5
NJ Holt-12
NM Udall-3
NV Berkley-1
NY Bishop-1, Ackerman-5, Clarke-11, Maloney-14, Arcuri-24 OR Wu-1, Blumenauer-3, DeFazio-4, Hooley-5
TN Cohen-9
WI Baldwin-2

84 CITIES/COUNTIES/TOWNS WITH IMPEACHMENT RESOLUTIONS

CA: Arcata, Berkeley, Fairfax, San Francisco, Santa Cruz, Sebastopol, West Hollywood
CO Telluride
IL Urbana
MA: Amherst, Ashfield, Brookline, Buckland, Cambridge, Colrain, Heath, Charlemont, Great Barrington, Lanesborough, Leverett, Leyden, Montague, Northampton, Pelham, Rowe, Shutesbury, Stockbridge, Warwick, Wendell, Whately
MD Takoma Park
MI Detroit, Ferndale
NC Carrboro, Chapel Hill
NH Hanover
NY :Ithaca, Woodstock, Middletown, New Paltz, Nyack, Plattsburg, Tompkins County, Town of Ithaca
OH Oberlin
VT: Peru, Plainfield, Putney, Richmond, Rochester Rockingham, Roxbury, Springfield, Stannard, St. Johnsbury, Sunderland, Brattleboro, Bristol, Brookfield, Burke, Calais, Craftsbury, Dummerston, East Montpelier, Grafton, Greensboro, Guilford, Hartland, Jamaica, Jericho, Johnson, Marlboro, Middlebury, Montpelier, Montgomery, Morristown, Newbury, Newfane, Townshend, Tunbridge, Vershire, Westminster, Wilmington, Woodbury